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Abstract 
 
The job of policing covers a wide range of activities including, traditional crime 
detection and punishment, and the non-traditional aspects such as community 
meetings.  However, the major focus of policing is on crime detection and prevention.  
This paper specifically considers these functions with respect to Basic Command 
Units  (BCUs) or ‘precincts’, and determines their relative efficiency in this key area 
using DEA and the little used stochastic distance frontier.  Relative Efficiency is 
measured in the context of a ‘pure production approach’ relating the incidence of 
various crimes (inputs) to the corresponding clear offences (outputs).  This type of 
efficiency ranking can also help in further analysing best practice in order to reduce 
crime and the fear of crime in many police forces.  The powerful non-linearity 
established in this relationship has important implications for police resourcing and 
funding as highlighted by Houpis et al (2001) 
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I. Introduction 
 
Since Becker’s (1968) seminal paper on the deterrence/prevention hypothesis of 
crime, economists have considered how governments can reduce the incidence of 
criminal activities in cities, districts and towns.  This analysis initially focused on a set 
of policy objectives based on the economic-sociological theories of criminal 
behaviour, but has now recently been refocused on the increasing costs of crime and 
policing.  For example, in the US, the cost of crime to victims has been estimated at 
over $200 billion per year (Miller et al (1993)) and in the UK at £60 billion ($90 
billion) per year for victims and in the running the criminal justice system (Home 
Office (2000)).  With respect to policing, over the last ten years US expenditure on 
policing has increased from over $36 billion to $65 billion in 2001 (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics) and English and Welsh police force expenditure has increased from £6 
billion ($9 billion) to over £9 billion ($13.5 billion) in 2001 (Home Office Statistics). 
 In the UK, however, the increase in police funding has not led to a 
proportionate decrease in national crime rates.  This contrasts with the US which has 
seen considerable decreases in crimes committed (reported) in recent years.  The FBI 
‘Crime Index Total’, for example, decreased from 13,989,543 in 1994 to 11,605,751 
in 2000, whereas total crime recorded in the UK increased from 5,100,241 to 
5,252,980 during the same period (Home Office Criminal Statistics).  Hence, this 
failure to reduce crime despite extra funding has been linked to the new efficiency 
drive instigated by the UK Government.  Furthermore, as the crime rate appeared to 
rise with the economic cycle, contrary to many economic theories, commentators 
began to question the effectiveness of the English and Welsh police forces.  Stephens 
(1994), for example, has identified the growing cost of, and increasing levels of 
crime, coupled with the declining public standing of the police force (associated with, 
miscarriages of justice such as the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six, and the 
miners’ strike in 1984/85,) as a major impetus in the re-evaluation of police functions. 
 These factors led to an inspection and review of English and Welsh police 
forces, firstly under the 1979 Thatcher Conservative government.  Since being elected 
in 1997, however, the new Labour government has carried on this agenda of 
promoting efficiency in the police force (see the Home Office Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) (1998) report “What Price Policing”).  The report reiterated the 
previous Conservative government’s efficiency drive in the police service with the 
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HMIC arguing that, “police managers need to work harder to ensure that Value For 
Money (VFM) is achieved, for competitive pressure has to be created internally.  The 
costing of activity with subsequent measurement and comparison of performance 
provide the means by which such encouragement is given” (para. 10).  Finally, in the 
analysis of police efficiency and its measurement the UK Government recently 
commissioned a report “Improving Police Performance” by the Public Services 
Productivity Panel (PSPP) (2000) 1.  The PSPP Report stated that “efficiency is a 
measure of the police’s performance in meeting their overarching aims and objectives 
for the money spent.” (page 4) and argued that the nonparametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and the parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) be utilised to 
estimate a ranking of best to worst police forces (for an example see Drake and 
Simper (2001)). 
 The desire to measure the efficiency of public services and especially police 
forces, is just not related to the UK experience.  Many national governments have set 
up agencies, departments and institutes, and enacted legislation in order to consider 
how policing performance can be assessed and to enable benchmarking.  Forerunners 
to the current changes in assessing public service efficiency in the UK can be seen, 
inter alia, in the US Government Performance and Results Act 1993 and changes in 
policing in Australia and Canada.  In the former case, the New York Police 
Department has been studied extensively in terms of their ability to reduce the level of 
crime, due to their successful introduction of CompStat.  This was hailed as a system 
that “at the core of it is the principle of accountability.  Holding the people who run 
the precincts accountable for achieving what the public wants them to do, which is 
reduce crime.” (page. 9, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani quoted in O’Connell (2001)).  In 
addition, the policing function has come under scrutiny in Australia, where policing 
has moved to an outputs objective budgeting approach in order to enable performance 
reviews (SCRCSSP (2000)).  Finally, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
aim for “continuing efforts to develop sound performance indicators as part of 
government-wide efforts to demonstrate value for money and accountability.” Page. 
14. (RCMP Report 2000). 
                                                 
1  Both authors of this study were advisors over a 2 year period to H. M. Treasury and Home Office on 
the issues of estimating police efficiency, resulting in recommendations outlined in the PSPP (2000) 
report. 
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 Hence, the need to assess the policing function has been deemed an important 
aspect of determining the allocation of scarce resources in government budgets 
around the world (for a review of UK policing see Drake and Simper (2002)).  There 
are however, difficulties in modelling the policing function, especially as some 
activities are not measurable, for example, walking the beat.  This has led economists 
to posit two methodologies, the cost and the production approach.  The former relates 
inputs/costs to possible outputs/outcomes (such as crime clear up rates): see early cost 
function estimation of US policing by Darrough and Heineke (1979), Gyimah-
Brempong (1987) and more recently Nyhan and Martin (1999); and for the UK, 
Cameron (1989), Drake and Simper (2000 and 2001).  The latter methodology relates 
the number of crimes committed to the effectiveness of forces in clearing up those 
crime: see Thanassoulis (1995) for a UK example, Sun (2002) for a Taiwanese 
example, and finally Diez-Ticio and Mancebon (2002) for an example of the 
production approach utilised to assess the efficiency of Spanish policing. 
This paper utilises a ‘pure’ production methodology in which we aim to rank 
Basic Command Units on their ability to clear up various acts of crime, and hence to 
deter future criminal activity.  The innovation to the literature is that we utilise a 
sample of Basic Command Units (BCUs), or precincts, from English police forces, 
and to the authors knowledge this is the first such work on UK policing.  In addition, 
we estimate and compare two techniques, the nonparametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), and the little used parametric Stochastic Output Distance Frontier 
(SODF).  The paper is structured as follows.  In Section II we discuss the 
methodology associated with modelling policing and present the nonparametric and 
parametric models utilised to estimate efficiency.  The data and variables utilised are 
presented in Section III; Section IV discusses the results; and we conclude with 
Section 5. 
 
 
II. Estimation Models and Data 
 
II.i.  Parametric Efficiency Analysis 
 
Given that the aim of policing is to maximise the clear up rates of crime at Basic 
Command Unit (BCU) level, we can write each BCU’s direct production function as 
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where y is a vector of outputs and x is a vector of inputs.  In the literature, it is then 
usual to specify a production and/or cost function with a stochastic error appended to 
the function.  However, the stochastic production frontier approach has the 
disadvantage that, as output is the dependent variable, only a single output production 
process can be modelled.  This is clearly not appropriate in policing as police forces 
deliver a range of services or outcomes.  Furthermore, it would be very difficult to 
construct an appropriate composite output (outcome) measure. 
 The usual solution to this problem in empirical applications is to make use of 
the duality between cost and production functions and to specify and estimate a 
stochastic cost frontier.  This permits the modelling of a multi-input, multi-output 
production process.  A particular drawback in utilising a cost function specification to 
model public sector services such as policing, however, is that this requires data on 
total costs, outputs and input prices.  While the latter are generally available for some 
inputs such as labour (staff), they are typically not available for capital inputs as this 
requires data on both capital expenditure and the units of capital utilised (see Drake 
and Simper (2000)).  A further potential drawback of the stochastic cost frontier 
approach is that any non-random deviations above the cost frontier will be associated 
with both allocative and technical inefficiency.  In contrast, the relative efficiency 
measures derived from the non-parametric methodologies such as DEA typically 
relate only to technical efficiency.  Hence, the relative efficiency measures derived 
from parametric and non-parametric approaches are often not directly comparable. 
 
 
II.ii. Stochastic Output Distance Frontier (SODF). 
 
A potential solution to these problems, but one that has not been widely used 
empirically, it to employ a parametric approach, but to specify and estimate a 
stochastic distance frontier rather than a stochastic cost or production frontier.  The 
distance function specification has the advantages of permitting the modelling of a 
multi-input, multi-output production process, and being a function only of outputs and 
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inputs.  Hence, the distance function does not require data on input prices.  
Furthermore, as it is a function of outputs and inputs, the stochastic distance frontier 
produces a relative efficiency measure that is directly comparable to the measure of 
technical efficiency produced by DEA, which is a non-parametric distance function 
technique.  For an introduction to the distance function concept see Cornes (1992), 
and for an empirical application see Coelli and Perlman (1999).  The output distance 
function estimated can be written as follows, where y is output and x are inputs,  
 
    ( ) ( ){ }xFy  miny,xO ∈θθ=D    (2) 
 
The output oriented distance function can be interpreted as the greatest radial 
expansion of the output vector, with the input vector held fixed.  The distance 
function  will take a value which is less than or equal to one hundred, 
whereby if it less than one hundred a radial expansion of 
( y,xDO )
θ1  is needed to reach the 
frontier. 
 In this paper we employ the popular Translog flexible functional form, where 
the output distance function with 6 outputs and 6 inputs can be expressed as: 
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Young’s theorem requires that the second order parameters of the distance function 
must be symmetric, that is, jiij σσ =  for all i, j, and nmmn γγ =  for all m, n.  Finally, 
homogeneity of degree 1 in outputs requires the following restrictions, , 
, and 
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A convenient method of imposing homogeneity upon the Translog distance function 
is to follow Lovell et al (1994) and observe that homogeneity implies that: 
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   ( ) ( ) 0any for  y,xDy,xD OO fωω=ω    (4) 
 
Hence, if we arbitrarily choose the kth output, and set ky1=ω  then, using TL( . ) to 
represent the Translog function, we can express the output distance function as: 
 
 ( ) ( )δγβσα= ,,,,,const,yy,xTLyDln kiikOi  
        i = 1,2,...,N  (5) 
 
or ( ) ( )δγβα=− ,,,,const,x,yyTLylnDln ikikOi  
        i = 1,2,...,N  (6) 
 
It follows that we can re-write this Translog distance function as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )Oikiik Dln,,,,,yy,xTLyln −δγβσα=−  
        i = 1,2,...,N  (7) 
Hence, if we append a symmetric error term, iυ  to account for statistical noise, and re-
write  as ( OiDln ) iµ , we can obtain the stochastic output distance function, with the 
usual composite error term, iii µ−υ=ε . 
 
 ( ) ( ) iikiik ,,,,,yy,xTLyln µ−ν+δγβσα−=  
        i = 1,2,...,N  (8) 
 
We make the standard assumptions that the iν  are normally distributed random 
variables while the iµ  are assumed to have a truncated normal distribution. 
 As is usual in the stochastic frontier approach, the predicted value of the 
output distance function for the ith firm, ( )iOi expD µ−= , is not directly observable, 
but must be derived from the composed error term, iε .  Hence, predictions for OiD  
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are obtained using Coelli’s Frontier 4.1 programme, based on the conditional 
expectation:2 
 
     ( )[ ]iiOi ED εµ−=     (9) 
 
 
II.iii. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
The non-parametric efficiency approach was originally developed by Farrell (1957) 
and later elaborated by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) and Fare, Grosskopf and 
Lovell (1985).  The constructed relative efficiency frontiers are non-statistical or 
nonparametric in the sense that they are constructed through the envelopment of the 
decision making units (DMUs) with the “best practice” DMUs forming the non-
parametric frontier.  This non-parametric technique was referred to as Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
 A particular advantage of non-parametric techniques such as DEA, relative to 
statistical or parametric techniques such as stochastic frontier analysis (see Drake and 
Weyman-Jones (1996) and Ferrier and Lovell (1990)), is that the latter must assume a 
particular functional form which characterises the relevant economic production 
function, cost function, or distance function.  Hence, any resultant efficiency scores 
will be partially dependent on how accurately the chosen functional form represents 
the true production relationship (i.e., the relationship between inputs/resources and 
outputs).  As DEA is non-parametric and envelops the input/output data of the DMUs 
under consideration, the derived efficiency results do not suffer from this problem of 
functional form dependency.  Examples of DEA applied to the analysis of police 
efficiency include, Thanassoulis (1995), Drake and Simper (2000) for the UK, and 
Carrington et al (1997) for New South Wales. 
 For each DMU in turn, using x and y, to represent its particular observed 
inputs and outputs, pure technical efficiency is calculated by solving the following 
output based linear programme 
 
                                                 
2  Given the transformation in equation (8) the production function procedure is used to obtain the 
correct efficiency scores for an output distance function using Frontier 4.1. 
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Choose {θ,λ} to:  min θ such that: λ’Y≥ y / θ 
     λ’X ≤ x 
  λi ≥ 0, Σλi = 1, i = 1,..., n      (9) 
 
Hence, in (9) we assume a variable returns to scale reference technology and 
concentrate exclusively on technical efficiency, i.e., the efficiency of translating 
inputs into outputs at the given scale of production.  Due to the difficulties in 
accurately measuring all input prices in public sector services such as the police force, 
this paper does not consider allocative efficiency. 
 
 
III. The Data and Variable Descriptions 
 
The availability of data at Basic Command Unit (BCU) level is a recent Home Office 
initiative, which many see as a forerunner to ranking the BCUs instead of the 43 
police forces (see Drake and Simper (2001)).  The first data set published by the 
Home Office is utilised in this study and compares the six main crime categories to 
offences cleared (clear up rates – UK terminology) for a sample of 293 BCUs from 38 
forces from 2001/02 (we have excluded the City of London and airports, the former 
due to the small size of the BCUs and the later due to the fact that airport BCUs have 
more diverse crime and management operations than normal BCUs).  The variables 
that are published by the Home Office can be split into 6 inputs and 6 outputs in 
accordance with a ‘pure’ production approach of modelling police efficiency. 
 As discussed above the production approach in this study follows 
Thanassoulis (1995), Diez-Ticio and Mancebon (2002) and Sun (2002).  In the 
former, utilising English and Welsh police force data, a DEA output based 
specification was modelled with inputs including violent crimes, burglaries, other 
crimes and the number of officers, and outputs including violent crime offences 
cleared (clear ups), burglary clear ups, and other crime clear ups.  This is also the 
format for Sun (2002) in a model of Taipei Municipal Police Departments.  Finally, 
Diez-Ticio et al (2002) use population and number of vehicles as possible additional 
influences on police efficiency scores.  Due to the unavailability of data on police 
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officer numbers at BCU level, we have advanced the ‘pure’ production approach 
relating crime clear ups to incidences of crime.3 
In this study, therefore, the inputs are number of crimes committed where; X1 is 
violent crimes against persons; X2 is sexual offences; X3 is Robbery; X4 is Burglary 
of dwelling; X5 is theft of a motor vehicle; and X6 is theft from a vehicle.  The 
outputs are the corresponding number of offences cleared (cleared up crimes), for 
example, Y1 is the number of violent crimes against the person cleared up, etc.,  The 
descriptive statistics of the input and output variables utilised in this study are 
presented in Table 1.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
 An analysis of the data shows wide variations in BCU crimes and clearups 
primarily linked to their geographic position, that is whether they are city or rural 
based.  For example, in terms of population size, the smallest BCU is Newcastle 
Central with a population of 4,211, while the second smallest, Birmingham City 
Centre has a population of 12,746.  In contrast, the largest BCU in the sample is 
Croydon with a population of 319,185.  However, population size does not appear to 
be highly correlated with the number of offences.  For example, in terms of the input 
X1, violence against the person, Newcastle Central recorded 996 and Birmingham 
City Centre 2554 offences, whereas Croydon (London) recorded 6059 and Southern 
(4th largest BCU with 309,548 population) 1,344 offences.4  In terms of offences 
cleared (clear ups), if we consider output Y1, violence against the person, South 
Manchester (population 298,558 – 6th largest) cleared the most crimes at 3,756 but the 
second placed North Manchester (population 139,994 – 186th largest) cleared 3362 
offences. 
                                                 
3  While it would be desirable to include the number of police officers as an input were the data 
available, it should be noted that the Police Funding Formula (PFF) is designed to ensure that police 
force BCUs are adequately resourced. 
4  English and Welsh police forces are funded through a Police Funding Formula which takes account  
of demographic, geographic and sociographic factors in the allocation of monies to forces through a 
regression equation.  That is, forces budgets are affected by whether they are inner-city, have high 
unemployment, high population density, etc., in their ability to reduce the level of crime within that 
area, see Home Office (1998). 
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IV. Results and Discussion 
 
IV.i Technical Efficiency 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics across the BCUs in each police force in terms of  
both the DEA and Stochastic Output Distance Frontier (SODF) efficiency results.5  
The Avon and Somerset force, for example, has 8 BCUs and their SODF efficiency 
score ranged from 63.00 to 86.35, with a mean of 75.21 (all BCU results are presented 
in the Appendix).  The results reveal a very wide range of efficiency scores  across 
police force BCUs.  In terms of the mean PTE efficiency scores in Table 2, for 
example, these range from 100 for forces such as Derbyshire, Cumbria, 
Northamptonshire, and North Yorkshire to 73.36 for the Metropolitan.  As would be 
expected, the mean SODF efficiency levels are somewhat lower than the PTE means 
as the former technique typically accords units an efficiency score of less than 100.  In 
contrast, when using  DEA it is often the case that many units are deemed to be on the 
efficient frontier and therefore exhibit a PTE score of 100.  Hence, the mean SODF 
scores range from 95.34 for the Gloucestershire force down to only 67.44 for the 
Staffordshire. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
 It is clear from these results, therefore, that some police forces display a 
consistently high level of efficiency across their BCUs, while other forces display 
both lower average levels of BCU efficiency and a greater range of efficiency levels.  
This is most evident by contrasting the maximum (Max) and minimum (Min) 
efficiency scores with the mean levels.  If we take the case of the North Yorkshire 
force, for example, all of its BCUs exhibit PTE scores of 100 while the mean SODF 
score of 95.16 reflects a range of efficiency scores between 99.39 and 86.79.  In 
contrast, the Metropolitan Police Force (London) exhibits a mean PTE score of 73.36 
and a Max and Min of 100 and 43.86 respectively.  The corresponding mean SODF 
score is 74.75 with a max and min of 99.57 and 45.14.  Similarly, the Hertfordshire 
                                                 
5  The Log-Likelihood Ratio to test for a one sided error was equal to 78.58 significant at the 1% 
critical level. 
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has a mean PTE score of 86.36 with scores ranging from 100 to 46.24.  These marked 
disparities in efficiency levels across BCUs within the same police force is illustrated 
very clearly in Figure 1, for the SODF scores, and in Figure 2 for the PTE scores. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
 With respect to Figure 1, this indicates that relatively few police forces have 
all their BCUs clustered close to the 100% efficiency level.  Furthermore, Figure 2 
also indicates very clearly that there are a number of forces which not only have 
relatively low mean SODF efficiency levels, but also have no BCUs which exhibit 
relatively high efficiency levels.  In other words the performance of these police 
forces is consistently poor across all BCUs.  Obvious examples include force 29, the 
Staffordshire, with a mean score of 67.44, and efficiency levels ranging between 
77.45 and 52.49.  Similarly, force number 31, the Surrey, exhibits a mean efficiency 
score of 67.98, a min of 45.99 and a maximum of only 80.64. 
 In summary, therefore, these results suggest that, for many forces, 
considerable benefit could be gained by the poorer performing BCUs learning from, 
and sharing the best practices of their better performing BCUs.  For other forces with 
generally poor performances across all their BCUs, however, more benefit would be 
gained by examining the best practice of the more efficient BCUs in other forces.  
Obvious benchmark forces in these cases would be the forces in which the BCUs 
consistently exhibit a relatively high level of efficiency compared to the BCUs in 
other forces.  For police forces generally, however, the results clearly indicate that, in 
many cases, forces could improve their overall efficiency by raising the levels of 
efficiency of their poorest performing BCUs towards the levels exhibited by their best 
performing BCUs. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
 Table 3 provides details of the top 20 and bottom 20 performing BCUs 
according to the SODF scores.  We elect to use the SODF scores in this instance as 
DEA tends to produce many BCUs which are jointly ranked at 100 according to the 
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PTE scores.  The best performing BCU is the Easington unit of the Durham 
Constabulary with an SODF score of 99.99, while the worst performing BCU is the 
Broxbourne unit of the Hertfordshire force with an efficiency score of only 39.21.  
With respect to the point made previously, that a number of forces have BCUs which 
display both very good and very poor performance, it is interesting to note that the 
Metropolitan Police Force has 3 units in the top 20, but no less than 10 units in the 
bottom 20.  Similarly, the West Yorkshire force has a BCU (Dewsbury, rank 4th, 
99.85) in the Top 20, but also a BCU (Weetwood, rank 285th, 59.76) in the bottom 20.  
Hence, these are clear examples of forces where there would be considerable merit in 
making a detailed investigation into the operating procedures of their best and worst 
performing BCUs, with a view to raising the efficiency levels of the latter and thereby 
improving the performance of the police force overall. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
 Due to the well established pros and cons of the non-parametric technique, 
DEA, and the parametric stochastic frontier technique, the recent PSPP (2000) report 
advocated the joint use of these techniques in assessing the relative efficiency of 
police forces.  In order to make the results as comparable as possible, we chose to 
utilize the stochastic distance frontier approach, as opposed to the stochastic cost 
frontier approach advocated in PSPP (2000), as it is the parametric analogue of DEA 
which is a non-parametric distance function technique.  The contrast between the two 
sets of efficiency results, PTE and SODF, is illustrated in Figure 3.  While there is 
clearly a strong positive correlation between the two efficiency measures (rank 
correlation 0.536, significant at the 1% level), which provides some cross validation 
for the two approaches, there are also some outliers.  It is clear, for example, that of 
the large number of BCUs ranked at 100 by DEA, the corresponding SODF scores 
range from 99.99 to 59.76 (see Appendix 1).  Conversely, there are BCUs which are 
rated as highly efficient according to SODF, but exhibit a relatively low PTE score.  
The Hounslow (Metropolitan), for example, has an SODF score of 97.17, but a PTE 
score of only 62.98.  While such cases tend to be the exception, they suggest the need 
for further investigation in order to establish the causes of the differential efficiency 
scores.  They also indicate the dangers in relying on one efficiency measurement 
technique in isolation. 
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IV.ii The Size Efficiency Relationship in Policing at the BCU level 
 
 It is potentially very informative to analyse the possible relationship between 
size and efficiency in policing at the BCU level.  With respect to technical efficiency, 
this amounts to establishing, for example, whether larger BCUs tend to be more, or 
less, efficient than their smaller counterparts.  As emphasized previously, we have 
applied a ‘pure’ production approach in which police force BCU efficiency is 
assessed in terms of their ability to translate recorded crimes into cleared-up crimes, 
without the specification of any economic inputs/costs such as labour, capital, etc.  
Hence, a natural measure of BCU size in this context is the total number of recorded 
crime incidents, i.e., the summation of inputs X1 to X6.  With this type of size 
specification, it is possible to hypothesise some alternative relationships between size 
and technical efficiency.  One possibility is a form of “learning by doing effect” in 
which those BCUs which experience higher incidences of recorded crime become 
more adept at solving those crimes.  This would suggest a positive correlation 
between size, as proxied by total recorded crimes, and technical efficiency.  
Alternatively, one might hypothesise that there might be a “swamping effect” in 
which the sheer volume of crimes with which the BCUs have to deal has a detrimental 
effect on their ability to solve or clear-up these crimes.  Clearly, this would imply a 
negative relationship between size and technical efficiency. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
 In the interests of brevity we illustrate the size – DEA technical efficiency 
relationship in terms of the scatter plot in Figure 4.  Although there is clearly a 
concentration of the efficient units at the low to moderate crime levels (below 9000 
incidents), this reflects the frequency distribution of total crimes across BCUs, rather 
than any underlying efficiency effect.  Indeed, it is quite clear that there are a large 
number of technically efficient BCUs right across the size spectrum up to BCUs 
experiencing total crime incidents of almost 26000.  Furthermore, it is clear from the 
scatter diagram that there is no apparent size-efficiency relationship, either positive or 
negative.   
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 Although there is no apparent relationship between size and technical 
efficiency, it must be recognized that the latter scores are derived under the 
assumption of variable returns to scale.  In other words this form of DEA efficiency 
analysis specifically allows for the possibility that there may be scale effects in 
respect of clearing-up crimes.  Hence, in order to examine this type of size-efficiency 
relationship, i.e., the presence of either increasing or decreasing returns to scale, we 
must examine the DEA scale efficiency results.  These are obtained by solving the 
linear programme (9) under the assumption of constant returns to scale (OE) rather 
than variable (PTE), i.e., without the constraint that Σλi = 1.  The ratio of the two sets 
of DEA efficiency measures then gives us a measure of scale efficiency:  SE = OE / 
PTE.  In order to establish the nature of the returns to scale, for those BCUs which are 
not scale efficient (SE < 100), we run the linear programme (9) once more under the 
constraint of non-increasing returns to scale.  Any disparity between the two sets of 
technical efficiency scores indicates the presence of increasing returns to scale (IRS), 
while consistency between the results indicates decreasing returns to scale (DRS). 
 In the interests of brevity the full set of scale efficiency results  are not 
presented (a full set of results are available from the authors on request).  
Interestingly, however, out of a total of 293 BCUs, no less than 192 exhibited DRS, 
with 88 BCUs exhibiting constant returns to scale (CRS) and only 13 exhibiting IRS.  
Furthermore, out of those 13 BCUs, the majority exhibited SE scores were close to 
100, i.e. above 99.5, with only 2 recording SE scores below 98 (93.46, 96.45).  Hence, 
BCUs in England appear to be dominated by DRS in respect of  clearing-up crimes, 
with very little evidence of IRS. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
 
The relationship between the DEA scale efficiency scores and size is illustrated in 
Figure 5.  Not surprisingly, given the predominance of BCUs exhibiting DRS, this 
indicates a very clear negative relationship between SE and size, as proxied by the 
total incidents of crime.  The scale efficient BCU’s are generally concentrated at total 
crime levels below 10000, with only one scale efficient BCU at crime levels above 
10500.  In contrast, the two forces with the largest incidences of crime, Lambeth 
(Metropolitan) and South Manchester (Manchester), have SE scores of 62.28 and 
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77.88 respectively.  A further indication of the powerful scale economies which 
appear to operate in clearing-up crimes at the BCU level is the fact that the largest 15 
BCUs (ranked by total crime incidents) have a mean SE score of only 73.13, whereas 
the smallest 15 have a mean SE score of 99.71.   
 With respect to possible explanations for the powerful negative relationship 
between SE and total crimes, and for the prevalence of DRS at the BCU level, the 
most likely explanation relates to the non-linearity of the relationship between the 
levels of crime and the resources required to fight those crimes.  This problem has 
been increasingly recognized in recent years (see, for example, Houpis et al, (2001)) 
and has been exacerbated since 1995/96 by the introduction of the Police Funding 
Formula (PFF).  In the key area of crime management, for example, the so-called 
workload factors such as personal crime incidents are related to a range of specific 
drivers such as unemployment rate, population density, owner occupation rate, etc.  
The technique used to establish the relationship between these key drivers and the 
workload factors is typically a basic regression analysis.  Hence, this approach 
assumes a linear relationship between these key drivers and crime incidents, but more 
crucially, as the regression analysis is used to generate workload factors, it also 
implicitly assumes a linear relationship between the incidents of crime and the 
workload (resources) required to deal with these crimes.   
 This problem has been highlighted by Houpis et al (2001) in the context of the 
largest police force in England, the Metropolitan Police Force.  They argue that, not 
only has the proportion of funding going to the Metropolitan declined significantly 
since the introduction of the PFF, but that non-linearity in the relationship between 
crime and crime fighting resources implies that some areas (BCUs) in London are 
disadvantaged by the use of average values for the key crime drivers across the whole 
of London.  They state that:  
 
“If the relationship between the levels of crime and the resources required to detect 
and deal with it were linear (i.e., double the level of crime required double the level of 
resources) then aggregating /averaging across London to derive the formula created 
no bias.  If, however, the relationship were non-linear, so that the higher levels of 
crime imply a higher cost/crime for detecting and dealing with it, then averaging 
across London could lead to a significant underestimation of the real resources 
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required to deal with the levels of crime reported in the capital – an area with double 
the number of crimes would face a 45% higher cost per crime.” (p. 34).  
 
 To the authors knowledge, this is one of the first pieces of research, using 
techniques such as DEA, to actually establish the presence of powerful non-linearities 
in the relationship between crime levels and crime offences cleared.  Furthermore, in 
showing that there is no obvious relationship between technical efficiency and crime 
levels, we are able to show that we have identified a genuine scale effect in policing 
rather than a problem of lower efficiency levels in larger BCUs (defined in terms of 
total crime incidents).   
 While this is an interesting and important result in its own right, it also has 
important implications for the future.  Specifically, the combination of non-linearity 
outlined above and the PFF suggests that BCUs and police forces characterized by 
relatively high levels of crime will become progressively more underfunded over 
time.  This will inevitably reduce their ability to deal effectively with the levels of 
crime they face and may result in declines in technical efficiency over time in respect 
of clearing-up crimes.  More worryingly, however, the socio-economic literature 
dating back to Becker (1968) suggests that criminals assess the probability of being 
caught prior to committing a crime.  Hence, it is likely that any such decline in the 
efficiency of crime detection and solving is likely to lead to an increase in the actual 
incidents of crime with the possibility that criminals may elect to operate in areas 
(BCUs) where the probability of detection is perceived to be low.6 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper is the first to employ both a parametric frontier distance function and non-
parametric distance function approach to assess the relative efficiency of BCUs in 
English police forces.  The results reveal considerable divergence in efficiency levels, 
both across police forces as a whole, and across BCUs within the same force.  This 
                                                 
6 Houpis et al (2001), for example, point out that: “The share of recorded crimes taking place 
in London has increased significantly during a period when overall crime levels have actually 
fallen”. (p. 27) 
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suggests considerable scope for the sharing of best practices across BCUs in the same 
police force, and also between the best and worst performing forces. 
 The strong positive rank correlation between the PTE and the SODF 
efficiency scores provides a good degree of cross-validation for the two alternative 
techniques and suggests that they are both credible relative efficiency measures in 
respect of the assessment of police force and BCU relative efficiency.  The presence 
of a number of outliers, however, suggests that it would be unwise to rely exclusively 
on one of these techniques in isolation.  These results echo the previous results 
obtained in Drake and Simper (2002) in respect of English and Welsh police force 
efficiency.  Further research is clearly required to establish the source of such 
discrepancies in the relative efficiency scores. 
 Finally, the DEA scale efficiency results reveal a powerful non-linear 
relationship between the level of crime and crime-clear-ups.  This suggests that there 
is also a non-linear relationship between total crime incidents and the resources 
required to tackle and solve these crimes.  This evidence, combined with the 
inherently linearity of the PFF implies that the BCUs with the highest crime levels 
may face a worsening under-funding in future years unless the PFF is fundamentally 
amended.  In turn, this under-funding suggests the emergence of a potential vicious 
circle in which under-funding reduces the efficiency of the management of crime in 
the high crime BCUs, which then promotes an increase in criminal activity and 
worsens the under-funding, etc. 
 An important agenda for future research will be to analyse the presence of 
scale effects at both the police force level and the BCU level in order to provide 
further analysis of the resourcing requirements of police forces / BCUs and to cast 
some light on possible restructurings which could be undertaken at both police force 
and BCU level in order to enhance overall efficiency.  
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  Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Basic Command Unit Summary Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum MeanStd. Deviation Variance
Inputs 
X1  173.00 8645.00 1877.03 1449.03 2099708.04
X2  13.00 536.00 121.82 85.94 7386.733
X3  1.00 4160.00 305.53 510.68 260798.66
X4 81.00 6543.00 1381.30 980.90 962176.95
X5 61.00 4912.00 1157.06 842.57 709939.64
X6 210.00 6964.00 2096.79 1229.45 1511549.88
Outputs 
Y1 168.00 3756.00 1138.57 593.49 352231.28
Y2 7.00 262.00 65.27 36.89 1361.12
Y3 1.00 318.00 54.26 56.05 3142.15
Y4 9.00 632.00 198.75 120.28 14468.26
Y5 10.00 494.00 141.74 85.72 7348.54
Y6 13.00 562.00 114.04 82.64 6830.89
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Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Basic Command Unit (BCU) and Overall Mean  
Police Force Efficiency Scores 
  Min Max  Min Max  
 BCU BCU BCU Mean BCU BCU Mean 
 No. SODF SODF SODF PTE PTE PTE 
1.  Avon and Somerset 8 63.00 86.35 75.21 69.60 100.00 83.84
2.  Bedfordshire 3 64.64 94.52 83.62 88.28 100.00 93.74
3. Cambridgeshire 3 77.20 99.98 89.65 86.39 100.00 95.46
4.  Cheshire 6 78.31 96.37 87.41 84.89 100.00 96.55
5.  Cleveland 4 63.96 91.13 76.26 78.36 100.00 94.59
6.  Cumbria 3 75.92 97.20 84.76 100.00 100.00 100.00
7.  Derbyshire 4 75.29 94.58 89.11 100.00 100.00 100.00
8.  Devon & Cornwall 16 74.54 99.25 89.68 79.97 100.00 98.60
9.  Dorset 4 61.94 92.84 73.49 69.87 90.07 79.65
10.  Durham 6 90.30 99.99 94.05 99.88 100.00 99.98
11.  Essex 9 75.28 92.62 83.46 73.02 100.00 94.18
12.  Gloucestershire 3 93.05 99.36 95.34 94.52 100.00 98.17
13.  Greater Manchester 11 79.90 95.32 89.05 89.86 100.00 97.81
14.  Hampshire 12 79.07 99.29 87.45 94.30 100.00 99.00
15.  Hertfordshire 9 39.21 97.19 81.13 46.24 100.00 86.36
16.  Humberside 4 69.81 88.73 79.28 70.72 100.00 83.37
17.  Kent 9 72.34 99.03 90.00 84.88 100.00 95.80
18.  Lancashire 6 80.72 97.25 89.55 91.52 100.00 97.72
19.  Leicestershire 5 82.78 97.86 90.65 85.79 100.00 94.95
20.  Lincolnshire 3 91.05 97.59 95.12 91.71 100.00 93.73
21.  Merseyside 11 71.87 96.40 85.22 79.31 100.00 92.91
22.  Metropolitan Police 32 45.14 99.57 74.75 43.86 100.00 73.36
23.  Norfolk 3 79.77 91.41 86.55 83.35 89.41 86.16
24  Northamptonshire 4 82.98 98.88 94.55 100.00 100.00 100.00
25.  Northumbria 15 79.29 99.20 90.94 77.89 100.00 95.18
26.  North Yorkshire 3 86.79 99.39 95.16 100.00 100.00 100.00
27.  Nottinghamshire 5 64.52 88.82 77.86 89.96 100.00 96.94
28.  South Yorkshire 11 83.00 98.74 88.72 89.29 100.00 95.92
29.  Staffordshire 4 52.49 77.45 67.44 66.64 100.00 89.03
30.  Suffolk 3 84.74 98.10 93.98 100.00 100.00 100.00
31.  Surrey 7 45.99 80.64 67.98 48.88 100.00 78.49
32.  Sussex 8 63.58 81.82 73.79 67.69 100.00 88.09
33.  Thames Valley 10 68.32 95.81 82.09 75.68 100.00 87.14
34.  Warwickshire 2 74.30 87.83 81.07 82.58 84.75 83.66
35.  West Mercia 6 80.98 98.02 85.32 81.04 100.00 90.43
36.  West Midlands 21 73.18 99.87 91.41 85.88 100.00 97.75
37.  West Yorkshire 3 59.76 99.85 91.11 83.60 100.00 97.30
38.  Wiltshire 3 61.63 92.82 79.70 91.84 100.00 96.88
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  Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Top and Bottom 20 Basic Command Unit SODF Efficiency Scores 
 Force Name Basic Command Unit 
1 Durham Easington 99.99
2 Cambridgeshire Southern 99.98
3 West Midlands F3 - Soho / Handsworth / Sandwell / Perry Barr 
/ Aston (part) 
99.87
4 West Yorkshire Dewsbury 99.85
5 West Midlands J1 - Brierley Hill / Dudley / Sedgeley / Gornal 99.76
6 Durham Darlington 99.68
7 Metropolitan Police Lambeth 99.57
8 North Yorkshire Eastern 99.39
9 Gloucestershire Forest and Gloucester 99.36
10 North Yorkshire Central 99.31
11 Hampshire North East Hampshire 99.29
12 Devon & Cornwall Torridge 99.25
13 Northumbria Newcastle Central 99.20
14 Metropolitan Police Haringey 99.17
15 Suffolk Southern 99.11
16 Metropolitan Police Hackney 99.10
17 Kent North Kent 99.03
18 Northamptonshire Western 98.88
19 South Yorkshire Rotherham East 98.74
20 Lancashire Pennine 98.72
 
 Force Name Basic Command Unit 
274 Sussex Senlac 63.58
275 Avon and Somerset North Bristol 63.44
276 Avon and Somerset North Somerset 63.00
277 Metropolitan Police Kensington and Chelsea 62.51
278 Metropolitan Police Sutton 62.16
279 Wiltshire Swindon (D) 61.63
280 Metropolitan Police Redbridge 61.46
281 Metropolitan Police Kingston-upon-Thames 61.18
282 Dorset Bournemouth 60.94
283 Hertfordshire Hertsmere 60.76
284 Metropolitan Police Richmond-upon-Thames 59.98
285 West Yorkshire Weetwood 59.76
286 Metropolitan Police Brent 59.38
287 Metropolitan Police Merton 57.09
288 Staffordshire North Staffordshire 52.49
289 Metropolitan Police Harrow 51.82
290 Metropolitan Police Bromley 51.25
291 Surrey Spellthorne 45.99
292 Metropolitan Police Hillingdon 45.14
293 Hertfordshire Broxbourne 39.21
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 Figure 2. 
Figure 1. 
Police Force’s Basic Command Unit SODF Efficiency Scores. 
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Figure 3.  
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Figure 4. 
Pure Technical Efficiency and Crime Incidences Relationship 
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Figure 5. 
Scale Efficiency and Crime Incidences Relationship 
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